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The consumption-leisure choice model implies that an exogenous change in tax rates will induce a change in
labor supply. This implication is expected to be important to labor supplied by secondary earners under a
progressive tax system when spousal income alters effective marginal tax rates. This paper examines labor
supply responses to the income tax changes associated with Japanese tax reforms during the 1990s. The
results indicate that the hours-of-work elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 0.8 for married women.
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1. Introduction
Consumer theory implies that an exogenous shift in the budget
constraint will induce a change in labor supply. Such a shift can occur
by tax changes. Tax reform often alters incentives faced by individuals
and thus may alter their work effort. Behavioral responses to tax
changes determine not only the relevance of economic theory but also
the deadweight loss of taxation and government revenue. Estimating
labor supply responses to tax rate changes is indeed one of the central
issues in empirical labor economics and public ﬁnance.
During Japan's so-called lost decade of the 1990s, the government
implemented various income tax cuts as a policy to stimulate the
economy and as a by-product of political compromise to introduce and
subsequently to increase the consumption tax in Japan. As in many
countries, Japan maintains a progressive tax system, under which
marginal tax rates go up in a stepwise fashion as income increases. On
the one hand, the cross-sectional variation in tax rates itself is not
considered exogenous because tax rates can vary according to hours of
work.On theotherhand,when tax reform is implemented, a change in the
tax schedule can generate a plausibly exogenous cross-sectional variation
in tax rates over time. A series of Japanese tax reforms during the 1990s
provides a good opportunity to identify the labor supply responses to tax
rate changes.
Married women are most likely to be affected by Japanese tax
reforms among all demographic groups for several reasons. First, the
literature suggests that male labor supply responses are zero or small
whereas female labor supply responses are measurable and possibly
large (Pencavel, 1987; Killingsworth and Heckman, 1987; Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999). Second, female labor supply is low in their late
20s and early 30s, and many married women work part time in their
late 30s and 40s in Japan, whereas prime-age male labor supply is
highly stable over the life cycle. Finally, there is the “spouse
allowance” system in Japan, which makes secondary earners in
households more susceptible to the effect of income tax. Under this
system, households with low-income secondary earners are eligible
for greater tax deductions; thus, there has been serious concern that
married women work less and adjust their income so that the spouse
allowance will not decrease.
This paper provides the ﬁrst estimate of labor supply responses in
Japan to the changes in tax rates associated with a series of tax reforms
using the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC). The spouse
allowance system also provides a useful source of variation in tax rates.
A life-cycle model of labor supply is used to analyze the impact of tax
reforms. After deriving an intertemporal labor supply function, a simple
solution is developed to solve the selection problem in employment for
the panel data model with endogenous regressors. An important
advantage of the approach here is that it can ﬂexibly allow for the
unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the regressors.
The next section presents an intertemporal optimization problem
and derives an estimable form of the intertemporal labor supply
function. Section 3 discusses the econometric problems that can arise
in estimating the labor supply model. Section 4 describes the key
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features of the Japanese tax system and the 1990s tax reforms.
Section 5 describes the panel data used in the analysis. Section 6
presents the empirical results. The ﬁnal section provides a conclusion.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. The model
Quasi-experimental studies typically use a static consumption-leisure
choice model as theoretical framework to analyze the impact of tax
reforms on labor supply (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Mofﬁtt andWilhelm,
2000;Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).1 Eissa and
Hoynes (2004) describe explicitly a unitary household model in which
the primary and secondary earners sequentially decide hours of work.
This study considers a dynamic model of consumption and labor supply
with uncertainty, although the assumption that married women are
secondary earners whomake their labor supply decisions conditional on
their husband's income is maintained here, too, in order to exploit the
variation in tax rates from the spouse allowance system in the empirical
analysis. Recently, Blundell et al. (2007a) have developed the collective
model of household labor supply in which male labor supply is discrete
and female labor supply is continuous and possibly censored. The
extension of the collective labor supply model to an intertemporal
framework is, however, left for futurework.Moreover, the assumption of
sequential decisionmakingmade here seems a fair approximation of the
actual decision process because more than 95% of observations in the
JPSC sample are couples in which the husband works full time and the
husband's earnings are greater than or equal to the wife's earnings.
The conceptual framework adopted here is the intertemporalmodel
of labor supply à la Heckman andMaCurdy (1980) andMaCurdy (1981,
1985). The model involves uncertainty because most tax reforms are
best described as once-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-tax
wages in the present and the future, as noted by Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999). Denote by Et the expectation operator conditional on an
information set in period t. Assuming that preferences are additively
separable over time and between consumption and leisure, the
intertemporal optimization problem faced by married women is to
maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of total utility:
E0 ∑
T
t=0
1 + ρð Þ−t uc ct ; s1tð Þ + uh ht ; s2tð Þ
h i
ð1Þ
subject to the budget constraint:
at + 1 = 1 + rt + 1
 
at + 1−τtð Þwtht−ct−ptqt ; ð2Þ
where ρ represents the rate of time preference, c is the consumption,
h is the number of hours worked, s1 and s2 are preference shifters, a is
the asset, r is the net-of-tax real rate of return on assets, w is the
hourly wage rate, τ is the effective marginal tax rate, p is an indicator
that equals one if the number of hours worked is positive and equals
zero otherwise, and q is ﬁxed costs of work.
A dynamic programming formulation of this problem provides a
convenient framework for characterizing optimal consumption and
hours decisions. Deﬁne V(at, st) as the optimum value of the
consumption-leisure choice problem given information up to period
t. The value function satisﬁes the Bellman equation:
V at ; stð Þ = max uc ct ; s1tð Þ + uh ht ; s2tð Þ +
1
1 + ρ
EtV at + 1; st + 1
  
;
ð3Þ
where s includes all relevant state variables.
The optimal solution can then be characterized by ﬁrst-order
conditions for consumption and hours, together with an intertem-
poral condition for the marginal utility of wealth in period t:
ucc ct ; s1tð Þ = λt ; ð4aÞ
uhh ht ; s2tð Þ≥−λtωt ; ð4bÞ
λt =
1 + rt + 1
1 + ρ
Etλt + 1; ð4cÞ
where ω is the after-tax wage rate, and λ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint. The derivation uses the result
that the Lagrangemultiplier equals themarginal utility of wealth by the
Envelop theorem. Eqs. (4a) and (4b) can be solved for consumption and
hours in termsofω,λ, s1 and s2 in the currentperiod. Themarginal utility
of wealth (λ) serves as the sufﬁcient statistic that captures all
information from other periods that is needed to solve the current-
periodmaximization problem. The implied solution for hours is referred
to as the Frisch (or λ-constant) labor supply function.
To derive an estimable form of the labor supply function, consider
themost popular parametric form in the analysis of intertemporal labor
supply. While the instantaneous utility of consumption can remain
unspeciﬁed, theutility of leisure is speciﬁed as an isoelastic function that
exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as follows:
uh ht ; s2tð Þ = −exp −
f + δkt + vt
σ
 
⋅ 1
1 + 1σ
h1 +
1
σ
t ; ð5Þ
where f is the time-constant unobserved taste heterogeneity, k is the
number of young children, and v is an idiosyncratic preference shock. 2
Although the implied solution conveniently helps the interpretation of
the model, the isoelastic function excludes a corner solution. Given the
fact that some married women are not employed, to allow for a corner
solution, consider an exponential function that exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) as follows:
uh ht ; s2tð Þ = −exp −
f + δkt + vt
α
 
⋅α exp ht
α
 
; ð6Þ
In the presence of uncertainty, themarginal utility of wealth can be
written as:
lnλt = Et−1 lnλt + εt; ð7Þ
where ε is the forecast error. TheEuler Eq. (4c) can thenbe rearranged as:
lnλt = ϕt + lnλt−1 + εt; ð8Þ
whereϕt = ln
1 + ρ
1 + rt
−ln Et−1exp εtÞð Þð .3 Theϕ term canbe captured by a
common macroeconomic effect if ε is identically distributed across
individuals. Substituting backward in Eq. (10) yields
lnλt =∑
t
ι = 1ϕι + ln λ0 +∑
t
ι = 1 ει: ð9Þ
That is, the λ term can be captured by a time effect that is common
across individuals and a ﬁxed effect that can vary across individuals.
The forecast error can be decomposed as:
εt = γ△ lnωt + ξt; ð10Þ
1 See also Mofﬁtt and Kehrer (1981) and Pencavel (1987) for experimental studies
on the US negative income tax programs in the late 1960s and 1970s.
2 Age and its square can also be included as taste shifters, but the estimating
equation derived below remains essentially unchanged.
3 Eq. (7) can be written as λt = exp Et−1lnλtð Þexp εtð Þ. Taking expectations yields
Et−1λt = exp Et−1lnλtð ÞEt−1exp εtð Þ, or equivalently, exp Et−1lnλtð Þ = Et−1λtEt−1exp εtð Þ.
Thus, λt = Et−1λt exp εtð ÞEt−1exp εtð Þ. The Euler Eq. (4c) in period t−1 can be rewritten as
Et−1λt = 1 + ρ1 + rt λt−1. Hence, λt =
1 + ρ
1 + rt
λt−1
exp εtð Þ
Et−1exp εtð Þ.
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where ξ is a stochastic error component orthogonal to changes in the
after-tax wage rate. The parameter γ represents the wealth effect
because of unexpected wage changes and thus must be non-positive.
The wage equation is speciﬁed in a way that is consistent with
standard human capital models. The lifetime wage path can be
described by:
lnwt = a + ϑt +
θ
2
t2 + ζt ; ð11Þ
where a is the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity in produc-
tivity, and ζ is a idiosyncratic productivity shock. The life-cycle wage
proﬁle is typically increasing and concave. In that case, ϑ≥0 and θ≤0.
Assuming the interior solution in the case of CRRA preferences, the
conditions (5) and (11) lead to the Frisch labor supply function:
ln ht = f + σ lnλ0ð Þ + σ lnωt + δkt + σ∑tι = 1ϕι
+ vt + σ∑
t
ι = 1 ει
 	
:
ð12Þ
This equation implies that, ﬁrst, hours of work are longer at the
points of the life cycle when wages are high. Second, hours of work
can vary with taste shifters such as the number of children. Finally,
under the assumption that ϕ is constant over time, hours of work
decline over the life cycle, if the rate of time preference is lower than
the real rate of return on assets. Other things being equal, hours of
work will be longer in a period of deﬂation and shorter in a period of
inﬂation. It should be noted, however, that the wage rate and the
interest rate vary concurrently according to macroeconomic condi-
tions. Disentangling the two effects on labor supply in aggregate data
is thus difﬁcult. Micro data are generally needed to identify the labor
supply elasticity.
The wage coefﬁcient is the Frisch elasticity which measures labor
supply responses to evolutionary wage changes along the lifetime
wage proﬁle. The Frisch elasticity is known to be the upper bound of
the Hicksian elasticity, which is greater than the Marshallian elasticity
when leisure is a normal good.4 Moreover, the Frisch elasticity can
overstate the impact of tax reforms because it ignores the unexpected
shift in wealth from a once-and-for-all change in net-of-tax wages, as
noted by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
The labor supply elasticity will not be consistently estimated when
ordinary least squares (OLS) is simply applied on Eq. (12) because λ0 is
unobserved but correlated with all wages over the life cycle. When panel
data are available, the marginal utility of wealth (λ0) and the persistent
preference heterogeneity (f) canbe eliminated by taking aﬁrst difference.
Substituting the forecast error Eq. (12) and the wage Eq. (11) into the
ﬁrst-difference equation of the Frisch labor supply Eq. (14) yields:
△ ln ht = σ + μð Þ△ ln 1−τtð Þ + △xtπ + △et ; ð13Þ
where △ represents the change in each variable between the two
adjacent periods, μ=σγ,△xtπ=(σ+μ)(ϑ−θ/2)+δ△kt+(σ+μ)θt+
σϕt, and△et=△vt+(σ+μ)△ζt+σξt. The coefﬁcient on the log of net-
of-tax rate (σ+μ) is the policy-relevant elasticity that accounts for labor
supply responses to parametric shifts in the lifetime wage proﬁle. Again,
cross-sectional variation in tax rates over time is required to identify the
labor supply elasticity.
Under the CARA preferences, the Frisch labor supply function can
be derived as:
△ht =
α + μð Þ△ ln 1−τtð Þ + △xtπ + △et if sheworks
0 otherwise
n
ð14Þ
where μ=αγ,△xtπ=(α+μ)(ϑ−θ/2)+δ△kt+(α+μ)θt+αϕt, and
△et=△vt+(α+μ)△ζt+αξt. The policy-relevant elasticity can be
calculated by α + μð Þh , where h is the sample mean of hours worked
among the employed.
2.2. Fixed costs of work
In the presence of ﬁxed costs, labor market participation does not
simply follow the corner-solution condition, as noted by Blundell et al.
(2007b). Instead, participation depends not only on the determinants
of hours worked but also on the components of ﬁxed costs, such as
transportation costs, child care costs, and job search costs that can
vary by family structure and by region. The decision to work follows
from
V1≥V0 ð15Þ
where:
V1 = max
uc ct ; s1tð Þ + uh ht ; s2tð Þ
+
1
1 + ρ
EtV 1 + rt + 1
 
at + 1−τtð Þwtht−ct−qt ; st + 1
 
2
64
3
75;
ð16aÞ
V0 = max uc ct ; s1tð Þ + uh 0t ; s2tð Þ +
1
1 + ρ
EtV 1 + rt + 1
 
at−ct ; st + 1
  
:
ð16bÞ
The participation condition implies that higher ﬁxed costs
decrease the value of, and lower the probability of, working.
3. Econometric issues
3.1. Instrumental variable method
Solving the lifetime utility maximization problem among the
participants results in the ﬁrst-difference version of the Frisch labor
supply function Eq. (16), where the dependent variable is change in
hours of work and the explanatory variables include change in the log
of net-of-tax rate, age, year dummies, and change in the number of
children.5 Age can be replaced with change in age squared. The error
term consists of idiosyncratic shocks in preferences, productivity, and
forecast error and thus may be heteroscedastic and serially correlated.
Moreover, the error term may be correlated with cross-sectional
variation in the actual tax rates over time. Because the changes in tax
rates are associated with previous earnings, some of the variation can
reﬂect labor supply responses to tax reforms.6 The ﬁrst-difference
estimator, which is also known as the difference-in-differences
estimator,7 will not be consistent. In the presence of mean reversion,
the change in hours of work should be larger for workers who
4 Consider a static optimization problem in which an individual maximizes a CRRA
utility function: u c;h; s1; s2ð Þ = g s1ð Þ 11 + 1η c
1 + 1η−g s2ð Þ⋅ 11 + 1σ h
1 + 1σ for η≤0 and σ≥0,
where g(⋅) is an unknown function, subject to the budget constraint: c=ωh+y.
Taking the derivative of the utility function with respect to h after substituting the
budget constraint leads to the ﬁrst-order condition: g nð Þh1σ = ω ωh + yð Þ1η . This
optimality condition implies that the Marshallian elasticity is εm≡
∂h
∂ω
ω
h
j
y
=
σ 1 + ηð Þωh + ηy½ 
η−σð Þωh + ηy and that the income elasticity is εy≡
∂h
∂y
y
h
j
ω
=
σy
η−σð Þωh + ηy.
By the Slutsky equation, the Hicksian elasticity is εh≡
∂h
∂ω
ω
h
j
u
= εm−
ωh
y
εy =
ση ωh + yð Þ
η−σð Þωh + ηy. The Hicksian elasticity is greater than the Marshallian elasticity when
leisure is a normal good. As seen above, the Frisch elasticity is εf =
∂h
∂ω
ω
h
j
λ
= σ ,
which is greater than or equal to the Hicksian elasticity. Therefore, εm≤εh≤εf.
5 The constant term is redundant conditional on year dummies.
6 This problem is similar to the one that arises in experimental studies of negative
income tax programs (Keeley and Robins, 1980; Mofﬁtt and Kehrer, 1981).
7 Hall (1975, p. 127) presents a difference-in-differences approach to control for
aggregate macroeconomic effects in examining the impact of negative income tax
programs.
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experienced a negative temporary shock in the previous year. The
estimated labor supply elasticity will then be biased downward. To
circumvent this problem, the approach proposed by Auten and Carroll
(1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) is used here.
To control for mean reversion, the lagged hours of work is ﬁrst
incorporated as an additional regressor into the hours-of-work Eq. (14):
△hit = β△ ln 1−τitð Þ + △xitπ + gðhi;t−1Þ + △e1it
for pit = pi;t−1 = 1;
ð17Þ
where x is the vector of observed attributes that includes the number of
children under the age of seven before compulsory education, the
number of children aged seven to 15 during compulsory education, age-
squared, and year dummies, e1 is the error term, p is an indicator that
equals one if the individual is employed and equals zero if she is a full-
time housewife, i is an index for individuals, and t is an index for year
hereafter. The labor supply responses to tax rates are denoted by β. To
mitigate the bias arising frommean reversion, the effect of lagged hours
of work is nonparametrically speciﬁed. In practice, the unknown
function g(⋅) is approximated by ﬁfth-order polynomials. After making
the exclusion restrictions tenable, the instrumental variable approach is
applied toEq. (17). The instrumentusedhere is constructed in away that
rules out the variation in tax rates arising from behavioral responses.
z1it = 1− τ˜itð Þ−ð1−τi;t−1Þ = τi;t−1− τ˜it; ð18Þ
where τ˜ represents the net-of-tax rate calculated from the previous
taxable income at year t−1 under the current tax system at year t. In
other words, τ˜ is the effective tax rate if the tax schedule alone changes.
Thus, the instrument (z1) indicates how the net-of-tax rate would
change in response to tax reforms without behavioral responses. The
reduced-formequation for the change in the log of net-of-tax rate canbe
described by:
△ ln 1−τitð Þ = κ1z1it + △xitκ2 + gðhi;t−1Þ + △e2it; ð19Þ
where△e2it is the error term.
3.2. Sample-selection correction method
A potential problem with the approach above is the composition
change of labor market participants. The estimated labor supply
responses may suffer from a selection bias if the composition effects
are not fully captured by an individual ﬁxed effect, a time effect, and
other observed attributes. To correct for the potential selection bias, a
simple panel-data model with an endogenous regressor is developed
here, building upon the sample-selection correctionmodel proposed by
Olsen (1980).
We assume that the participation condition (15) canbe approximated
by an index function in a linear form:
pit = z2itκ3 + xitκ4 + ai + e3it ; ð20Þ
where z2 is ﬁxed costs that vary by regional labor market conditions, a
is an individual ﬁxed effect, and e3 is the error term. The regional labor
market conditions are speciﬁed as the interaction terms between 47
prefectural dummies and nine year dummies. This speciﬁcation is
motivated by the fact that ﬁxed costs, such as commuting costs, child
care costs, and job search costs, vary across regions over time. The idea
to use the regional labor market conditions as excluded instruments is
similar to the one proposed by Blundell et al. (1987). By virtue of
linear speciﬁcation, the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity can
be eliminated after the ﬁrst-difference transformation:
△pit = z2itκ3 + △xitκ4 + △e3it ; ð21Þ
For identiﬁcation and estimation, the following set of assumptions
is imposed on the model presented above: (a) (p,x,z2) is always
observed, whereas (h,τ,z1) is observed when p=1. (b)E △e3 j½
△Z = E△e3 j△Z2½  = 0, where △ Z=(z1, z2,△ x, g(hi , t− 1)) and
△ Z2 = (z2 ,△ x); (c) κ3≠ 0; (d) E △e1 j△e3;△Z½  = E △e1 j½
△e3 = ψ△e3; (e) e3 has a uniform distribution; (f) E△e1 j△Z½  = 0;
(g) κ1≠0; (h) E△e2 j△Z½  = E △e2 j△Z1½  , where △Z1=(z1,△x,g
(hi, t−1)).
Assumption (a) states the observational rule. Assumption (b) is
necessary to estimate consistently the selection equation (20).
Assumption (c) is the rank condition for excluded instruments. The
exclusion restriction is crucial for identiﬁcation, as the sample-
selection correction term is a linear function. In other words, the
sample-selection correction term is linearly dependent on the other
explanatory variables in the absence of an excluded instrument in the
selection equation; thus, the parameter ψ is not identiﬁable.
Assumption (g) requires the excluded instrument, which is the
predicted change in net-of-tax rates assuming that income remains
the same as in the base year, to be correlatedwith the log of net-of-tax
rate.
Under assumptions (d), (e), and (f), it follows that E[△e1it|△Zit,
pit=pi, t−1=1]=ψ△e3it.8 Under the additional assumption (h), the
hours-of-work equation can be rewritten as:
E △hit j△Zit ;pit = pi;t−1 = 1
h i
= βE △ln 1−τitð Þ j△Z1it ;pit = pi;t−1 = 1
h i
+ △xitπ + g ht−1ð Þ + ψ△e3it; ð22Þ
where the last term serves as the sample-selection correction term.9
In practice, the residual term is interacted with the year dummies to
allow for the differential effect of sample selection over time. If the
estimated coefﬁcients on the selection correction terms differ
statistically signiﬁcantly from zero, the estimation suffers from
selection bias in the absence of sample-selection correction terms.
The estimation procedure requires only a linear regression as
follows. First, the residual is constructed after a set of parameters
(κ3,κ4) is consistently estimated via OLS regression of (21). Then, the
instrumental variable method is applied to estimate Eq. (22), where
the residual constructed in the ﬁrst step is included as the selection
correction term, and a set of parameters (β,π,ψ) is consistently
estimated. Alternatively, instead of the instrumental variable method,
OLS can be applied to the ﬁrst-difference equation (17) after the
selection correction terms and the residual constructed from the OLS
regression of (19) in the presence of the sample-selection correction
terms are incorporated as additional regressors. The standard errors
are computed using a block bootstrap technique in which the
sampling unit is an individual to allow for heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.
Importantly, the sample-selection correction model developed
here can allow for an arbitrary correlation between regressors and
unobserved heterogeneity. As proposed by Semykina andWooldridge
(2005), it is also possible to estimate the selection equation using a
probit model under the normality assumption. However, this
speciﬁcation requires the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity
can be expressed as a linear projection of observed characteristics.
Moreover, our method does not suffer from the incidental parameter
problem, unlike the Tobit model analyzed in Heckman and MaCurdy
(1980). Another advantage is computational simplicity.
The distributional assumption for the error term appears to be
strong, and it may be considered a disadvantage. In general, the
drawback of the linear probability model is that the predicted
response probability does not necessarily fall within the range
8 The derivation does not rely on the assumption that the error terms are jointly
normally distributed.
9 Card (1990) employs essentially the same approach.
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between zero and one. However, the estimator is consistent as long as
the mean independence assumption, i.e., assumption (b), holds, and
the prediction approximately overlaps between the linear probability
model and the probit/logit model around the middle of the
distribution. Moreover, Newey (1999) shows that the linear sample-
selection correction model proposed by Olsen (1980) may provide a
consistent estimator under certain conditions placed on regressors,
despite its misspeciﬁcation of the distribution. In other words, the
uniform distribution assumption, i.e., assumption (e), is not necessary
for consistency, and it can be replaced by the set of conditions
presented in Newey (1999). However, this result does not extend to
the non-linear sample-selection correction model, where the selec-
tion equation is speciﬁed as a probit or logit model. Therefore, which
parametric assumption is stronger is not deﬁnitive.
4. Institutional background
4.1. Tax basis, deductions, and progressivity
As in many countries, income tax is imposed on individual taxable
income, and the labor income tax is progressive in Japan. There are
several tax brackets, andmarginal tax rates increase by roughly 10% in
each bracket. The number of tax brackets was ﬁve until 1998 and
decreased to four in 1999. The maximum marginal tax rate then
decreased from 50% to 37%. Labor income is taxed separately from
capital income which is taxed uniformly.
Various tax deductions are permitted in Japan. Some tax deduc-
tions such as the allowance for dependents can reduce the taxable
income of either the husband or the wife, but not both. Thus, spousal
income can affect themarginal tax rate and the amount of tax liability.
Moreover, the amount of the spouse allowances varies with spousal
income within a certain range of income.10 The rate of deduction for
employment income varies with labor income from 5% to 40% when
gross income exceeds 1.65 million yen.
4.2. Spouse allowances
The spouse allowance permits individuals with spouses earning
low incomes to deduct an amount of tax liability. More speciﬁcally,
the sum of the spouse allowance and special spouse allowance,
denoted by SA, varies according to the secondary earner's income,
denoted by IS, and is deducted from the primary earner's tax liability
as follows:
SA =
SAmax if I
S
bc1 “plateau”;
SAmax− IS−c1
 	
if c1≤ISbc2 “phase out”;
0 if c2≤IS;
8><
>: ð23Þ
where SAmax=0.7, c1=0.65, and c2=1.35 million yen until 1994,
and c2=1.41 million yen from 1995.11 The phase-out region is
generated by the decrease in the special spouse allowance. The
shape of the spouse allowance schedule looks similar to that of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as illustrated in Fig. 1. There is,
however, no phase-in region in the spouse allowance system. This
implies that the spouse allowance system does not create incentives
but only disincentives to work.
Consider a household in which primary and secondary earners
share a common budget constraint. The spouse allowance system
alters the secondary earner's marginal tax rates as well as the amount
of the primary earner's tax liability in the phase-out region, because
the deduction amount for the special spouse allowance decreases
proportionally with spousal income, as noted by Akabayashi (2006).
Fig. 2 shows that the effective marginal tax rates of the secondary
earner fall into four categories after spouse allowances are taken into
account. The plateau region corresponds to the ﬁrst income range, the
phase-out region corresponds to the second and third income ranges,
and there is no spouse allowance in the fourth income range. Thus, the
effective marginal tax rate equals the secondary earner's own rate in
the ﬁrst and last income ranges. In contrast, in the second and third
income ranges, the effective marginal tax rate faced by the secondary
earner equals her own marginal tax rate plus the primary earner's
marginal tax rate, because the sum of the spouse allowance and the
special spouse allowance decreases at the same rate as income
increases.12 Although the basic allowance and the deduction for
employment income lower the individual tax liability to zero in the
ﬁrst and second income ranges, the effective marginal tax rate of the
secondary earner is not zero but her husband's marginal tax rate in
the second range. The second and third categories of annual income
ranged from 0.7 to 1 million yen and from 1 to 1.35 million yen,
respectively, until 1994, and from 0.7 to 1.03 million yen and from
1.03 to 1.41 million yen, respectively, after 1995. The ﬁrst and last
categories are outside these intervals.
10 There is basically no variation in effective tax rates for those who have no
individual labor income when individual income is taxed separately from spousal
income, and when labor income is taxed separately from capital income.
11 The exchange rate of the Japanese yen to the US dollar ranged from 94 to 131 yen
between 1993 and 1999.
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Fig. 1. Spouse allowances.
12 However, individuals whose annual taxable incomes are greater than or equal to
10 million yen are not eligible for the special spouse allowance.
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4.3. The 1990s tax reforms
Five reductions in income tax were implemented during the
1990s, as summarized in Table 1. In fact, a series of Japanese tax
reforms in the 1990s signiﬁcantly altered the marginal tax rate for
many people. No tax reform relevant to this study was implemented
between 2000 and 2002. The structure of the income tax cuts varied in
each case. Of the ﬁve tax cuts, two were permanent, two were
temporary, and one included both permanent and temporary cuts.
Permanent changes were implemented in three ways. First, the tax
brackets were changed in 1994 and reduced in 1999. Second, in 1999
the maximum tax rate was reduced from 50% to 37%. Third, personal
tax deductions, such as the basic allowance, the allowance for
dependents, the spouse allowance, and the special spouse allowance,
were increased by 30 thousand yen in 1995.
Temporary changes were implemented in two ways. First, a 15% or
20% tax refund of the income tax liability, called the special tax cut,
was introduced temporarily in 1994, 1995, and 1996. In 1999, a 20%
ﬁxed rate tax cut was introduced without a speciﬁed time limit. The
upper limits of the tax refunds in 1994, 1995, and 1996 were
2 million yen, 50 thousand yen, and 50 thousand yen, respectively.
Second, in 1998, the ﬁxed amount of income tax refund was made
proportional to the number of dependents. 13
5. Data
Theoretical and econometric issues have been discussed so far on
the assumption that panel data are available. The data used in the
analysis are from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) from
1993 to 2002. A nationwide representative sample of 1500 women
aged 24 to 34 has been surveyed each year since 1993, and 500
women aged 24 to 27 have been surveyed each year since 1997. The
analysis of hours worked focuses on married women who report
after-tax income for at least two sequential years, along with their
husbands, to calculate their tax rates. The appendix provides details
on calculating income tax. Respondents are excluded from the sample
if there are missing values or clearly inconsistent responses regarding
employment status, hours of work, and income. Based on these
criteria, the sample consists of 3070 observations from an unbalanced
panel of 659 married women. Full-time housewives are added when
estimating the sample-selection correction model, bringing the
sample to 7040 observations from 1177 married women.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the sample used in the
analysis. There is considerable cross-sectional diversity in employ-
ment status and industry. The analysis here is not limited to tenured
or permanent employees. In particular, 53% of the employed are
employed as part-time workers, who can change their hours of work
more ﬂexibly. The standard deviation among part-time and tempo-
rary workers is indeed 36% higher than that among full-time workers.
Moreover, year-to-year variation in the type of employment and
industry are commonly observed among married women. During the
sample period, 19.6% of the 659 married women changed their
employment status one or more times, 31.7% changed their industry
one or more times, and 39.9% changed either their employment status
or industry one or more times. The JPSC collects information about the
allocation of time separately for weekdays and weekends. The
number of weekly hours worked used in this study is calculated
from that information and may be more reliable than the number
calculated from retrospective information about annual hours of
work. Comparing the employedmarriedwomenwith housewives, the
employed married women have slightly low-income husbands and a
small number of children under the age of seven. Importantly, 40% of
the employed married women are eligible for spouse allowances.
Their labor supply behavior may be susceptible to the effect of tax
system.
Osano and Inoue (1991) and Beason (1992) raise the question of
the applicability of the intertemporal substitution model to the
Japanese labor market. Both studies use aggregate data and obtain
mixed results. Some of the results in these studies are not in favor of
the intertemporal substitution model, but a failure to ﬁt the
intertemporal labor supply model can be attributed to the nature of
aggregate data, as discussed above. During the sample period from
1993 to 2002, the Japanese economy has been stagnant, which may
bring up the same question. Yet, the unemployment rate stayed at
5.4% in 2002, although it increased from 2.4% in 1993, according to
OECD statistics. Moreover, this study is designed to better ﬁt the labor
supply model to the data. First, the analysis here focuses on married
women whose labor supply tends to vary relative to other
demographic groups. Second, a series of tax reforms is used to
identify labor supply responses. Finally, the demand-side conditions
in the labor market are incorporated in the selection equation.
Table 1
The 1990s tax reforms.
Year Description of tax cuts
1994 20% tax refund of the amount of income tax up to 2 million yen
1995 Changes in tax brackets, expansions of various types of deductions, and 15%
tax refund of the amount of income tax up to 50,000 yen
1996 15% tax refund of the amount of income tax up to 50,000 yen
1998 Tax refund of 38,000 yen plus 19,000 yen times the number of dependents
1999 Changes in marginal tax rates and 20% cut in the amount of income tax up to
250,000 yen
13 An interesting question may be whether and how labor supply responses differ in
response to permanent and temporary tax changes. One way of testing this question
may be to examine the responses to only those tax changes associated with permanent
tax reforms. However, the distinction between temporary and permanent changes is
not obvious in all cases.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variables Mean (SD) Variables %
Panel A: Employed married women
Hours of work per week 35.3 (12.4) Employment status
Monthly after-tax labor
income of
Full-time worker 42.9
Married woman 12.4 (7.6) Part-time worker 53.2
Her husband 26.8 (9.8) Temporary worker 3.7
Age 34.0 (4.4) Non-response 0.2
Number of children Industry
Under the age of 7 0.60 (0.78) Agriculture, forestry,ﬁsheries,mining 1.0
Aged 7 to 15 0.91 (0.93) Construction 2.4
Aged 16 to 22 0.09 (0.35) Manufacturing 16.5
Educational background Wholesale, retail 26.0
Junior high school 2.8 Finance, insurance, real estate 7.5
High school 51.1 Trafﬁc, communication 2.4
Career college 16.2 Electric, gas, water, heat 0.5
Junior or technical
college
20.1 Service 27.7
University or graduate
school
9.6 Public 15.7
Others 0.3
Panel B: Housewives
Monthly after-tax labor income of Educational background
Married woman 0.0 (0.0) Junior high school 5.9
Her husband 30.0 (12.4) High school 43.0
Age 32.6 (4.0) Career college 18.2
Number of children Junior or technical college 21.7
Under the age of 7 1.16 (0.84) University or graduate school 11.2
Aged 7 to 15 0.59 (0.84)
Aged 16 to 22 0.03 (0.21)
Notes: The unit of income is 10,000 yen.
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6. Empirical results
The results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 are obtained by
applying the instrumental variable method to the ﬁrst-difference
equation (17) using the excluded instrument (22). The results are
presented in both the presence and absence of year dummies. In the
absence of year dummies, the constant term is included in the
covariates. The standard errors and the test statistics reported here
are all robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The
parameter estimates obtained here are consistent with the standard
results in the literature (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1987). The
estimated coefﬁcient on the log of net-of-tax rate suggests a positive
and moderately large labor supply response. The effect of income tax
on hours of work differs statistically from zero at the 5% signiﬁcance
level in the absence of year dummies and at the 10% signiﬁcance level
in the presence of year dummies. A 10 percent point decrease in the
marginal tax rate increases hours of work by 2.8 per week. The
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 0.81 at the sample
mean of hours worked. The number of young children decreases
hours of work, although the estimated effect is not statistically
signiﬁcant. These results are robust to outliers in hours of work. The
joint signiﬁcance level of the ﬁfth-order polynomials in lagged hours
of work is 0.00.
The results reported in column 3 are obtained by implementing
the sample-selection correction method developed in the earlier
section. In the estimation of the labor market participation equation
(21), the F-statistic is 58.13 with a p-value of 0.00 under the null
hypothesis that all of the coefﬁcients on the excluded instruments are
zero. This means that year-speciﬁc regional labor market conditions
provide the sample-selection correction terms with independent
variation and that the rank condition for identiﬁcation holds. Then, in
the estimation of the hours-of-work equation (22), the χ2 statistic is
7.84 with a p-value of 0.55 under the hypothesis that all of the
coefﬁcients for the sample-selection correction terms are zero,
indicating no sample-selection bias. The estimated tax effect is indeed
identical to that in column 2.14
The correlation between the instrumental variable and the
endogenous variable is strong in the ﬁrst-stage regression of (23).
In other words, the changes in effective tax rates are strongly
associated with the tax changes arising from tax reforms from
columns 4 to 6 of Table 2. The results indicate that tax cuts reduce net-
of-tax rates, as expected. Under the hypothesis that the coefﬁcient of
the excluded instrument equals zero, the F-statistics are 158 in the
absence of year dummies in column 4, 127 in the presence of year
dummies in column 5, and 118 in the presence of year dummies and
sample-selection correction terms in column 6. The instrument used
is strong enough to make an inference for the ﬁnite sample.
Finally, given the result that no sample-selection bias can be found,
the instrumental variablemethod is also applied to the ﬁrst-difference
equation in double-log form using the same instrument in Table 4. The
estimated parameters obtained in Table 4 are similar to those in
Table 3. Overall, the labor supply elasticities range between 0.81 and
0.83 in the presence of year dummies.
The labor supply responses of marriedmen and unmarried women
may also be relevant in determining the effects of tax policy. To
examine their behavioral responses, the same analysis is conducted
separately for married men and unmarried women. This exercise
reveals small and highly statistically insigniﬁcant elasticities with
respect to the net-of-tax rate for both married men and unmarried
women. Thus, the labor supply responses of married men and
unmarried women to the 1990s tax reforms appear to be negligible.
Labor supply responses to tax rates can vary with the income
range. To examine whether the responses to tax reforms are
heterogeneous across individuals with different income levels, the
same analysis is conducted using subsamples split by income ranges.
The results reveal no statistically signiﬁcant differences between the
subsamples. However, in part, this may be because of a reduction of
the sample sizes and of variation in tax rates after splitting the sample.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine labor supply responses to tax
rate changes. Various tax reforms implemented in Japan during the
1990s were used as quasi-experiments to determine the causal
relationship between labor supply and tax rates. Although the effects
identiﬁed by quasi-experimental studies are considered to be
plausible because the source of exogenous variation is transparent,
the quasi-experimental approach can be critiqued with regard to the
economic interpretations of the estimation results. Thus, an inter-
temporal model of labor supply was described to clarify the
interpretation and identiﬁcation assumptions. The analysis of panel
data using the instrumental variable method and the sample-
selection correctionmethod indicates that taxation has non-negligible
disincentive effects on labor supply by married women. The ﬁndings
are consistent with income adjustment behavior by married women
who are susceptible to the effect of the spouse allowance system.
14 These results hold even after prefectural dummies are added only in z2 or in both x
and z2.
Table 3
First-difference instrumental variable estimates for hours of work.
Dependent variable Hours of work Log of net-of-tax rate
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of net-of-tax rate 25.9 28.2 28.2
(12.4) (14.6) [13.4]
Tax reforms 0.75 0.72 0.72
(0.06) (0.06) [0.06]
# children aged 0–6 –0.34 –0.35 –0.27 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.64) (0.65) [0.67] (0.00) (0.00) [0.00]
# children aged 7–15 –0.04 –0.04 –0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.60) (0.62) [0.63] (0.00) (0.00) [0.00]
Elasticity 0.74 0.81 0.81
(0.36) (0.42) [0.38]
Year dummies? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Selection correction terms? No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and square brackets are clustered at the
individual level. Standard errors in square brackets are estimated by block bootstrap.
The labor supply elasticity is evaluated at the sample mean of hours of work. Other
covariates in the ﬁrst-difference equation include the constant term, the change in age-
squared, and the ﬁfth-order polynomials in lagged hours of work.
Table 4
First-difference instrumental variable estimates for the
log of hours of work.
Dependent variable Log of hours of work
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Log of net-of-tax rate 0.77 0.83
(0.37) (0.44)
# children aged 0–6 –0.02 –0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
# children aged 7–15 –0.01 –0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Year dummies? No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the individual level. Other covariates in the ﬁrst-
difference equation include the constant term, the
change in age-squared, and the ﬁ f th-order
polynomials in lagged hours of work.
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Appendix. Calculation of income tax
The marginal tax rates and the amount of tax liability have non-
linear relationships with taxable income and the number of
dependents. The withholding tax table for monthly salary payments
reports the amount of labor income tax liability that corresponds to
taxable labor income and the number of dependents. The JPSC collects
data on the monthly after-tax incomes of respondents and their
husbands, and on the number of children that they have.
Using the tax table and the data set, income tax is calculated as
follows. First, the marginal tax rates are calculated from the tax table,
after both permanent and temporary tax cuts are taken into account.
Second, the after-tax income, which corresponds to the amount of tax
liability, is calculated as taxable income less the amount of tax liability
from the tax table. Third, the number of dependents for each
individual is calculated from the data set. Children and a spouse
earning lower than a certain threshold are considered dependents. It
is assumed that couples will deduct the dependent allowance from
the taxable income of the higher-earning spouse to gain a tax
advantage. Fourth, data on the marginal tax rates and the amount of
tax liability from the tax table are matched to the JPSC data on after-
tax income and the number of dependents. Finally, the spousal
marginal tax rates are added to themarginal tax rates, and the amount
of spousal tax liability is deducted if the before-tax income falls into
the second or third income ranges.
The sample distribution of marginal tax rates is summarized as
follows. Among the 3070 observations of employed women, the
effective marginal tax rate is zero for 17.3%, greater than zero but less
than 0.1 for 68.8%, greater than or equal to 0.1 but less than 0.2 for
13.8%, and greater than or equal to 0.2 for 0.001%. In fact, the various
tax deductions lower the marginal tax rate.
The author recognizes the limitations of calculating income tax
from the withholding tax table for monthly salary payment. This table
does not account for several tax deductions, such as deductions for life
insurance premiums, casualty insurance premiums, and buying a
home, which can be claimed as a year-end tax adjustment. However,
more accurate approximation is beyond the scope of this paper. The
measurement-error problem can be alleviated by the instrumental
variable method.
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